Monday 29th of April 2024

a way of life attacked .....

a way of life attacked .....

Progress has been made in fighting terrorism since the outrages of September 11.

Time not only heals wounds but also changes perspectives. The greatest apprehension felt by Americans after the attacks of September 11, 2001, was that there would be further attacks on their country; the questions were when and where, rather than if. Understanding this is central to a proper historical analysis of American actions, and those of her allies such as Australia, over the past 10 years.

The al-Qaeda-orchestrated attacks on New York and Washington represented a greater violation of American sovereignty than even Pearl Harbour. The shock, anger and retaliatory resolve of Americans were understood, without demur.

There was overwhelming public support for the strike against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in October 2001. The blame was accurately and properly fixed, and few Americans or Australians doubted the justice of military action to deny terrorists the haven that had made possible the outrages of September 11.

Now, 10 years on, the mood is different. Like all military commitments that last a long time, the war in Afghanistan now has less public support. But the merits have not altered: the haven must still be denied; there is, in fact, the added dimension of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, more fragmented and unstable than in 2001. If America and her allies leave Afghanistan prematurely, the terrorist cause in neighbouring Pakistan will receive a huge boost.

Rather, the perspective has changed. Americans and others have lost their fear of further terrorist attacks. In the process little credit was given to the efforts of both George Bush (for most of the time) and Barack Obama (in recent years), for the leadership they gave that has kept the US free from the new acts of terrorism so widely thought of as virtually inevitable 10 years ago.

History will judge Bush on how he handled the terrorist threat to his country; likewise it will judge Obama on his handling of the American economy after the global financial meltdown. The jury is still out on the latter; Bush deserves credit for what he did to keep America safe for seven years after the September 11 attacks.

The Gillard government - with the steadfast support of the Coalition - is right to maintain Australia's military commitment in Afghanistan. We mourn the loss of 29 Australian soldiers, and are conscious of the injuries sustained by others. The Australian Defence Force fights bravely and effectively in Afghanistan; there is progress, although painfully slow on occasions, in enhancing the capacity of the Afghan military to manage without foreign forces.

September 11, 2001 not only involved a sickening terrorist attack but expanded the meaning of warfare. It took us beyond the conventional understanding of armies rolling across borders. Always important, timely intelligence became crucial. Historically close, Australia's intelligence sharing arrangements with traditional allies such as the US and Britain became even more intimate - a further reminder of the enduring value of our links with those countries.

In the past 10 years thousands have become victims of terrorist attacks, including, most vividly recalled, those 88 Australians who died in Bali. Yet, despite natural public weariness with the seemingly endless fight against terrorism, the balance sheet of the decade is more positive than not. In our own region, Indonesia, the most populous Muslim nation of all, has been consolidated as the third largest democracy in the world. Its government and security agencies have joined arms with Australia to fight the terrorist scourge.


September 11 10th Anniversary

In his appalling piece, little "rattus" makes no mention of the hundreds of thousands of innocents sent to their deaths by the evil trio, Bush, Blair & himself, in Iraq & Afghanistan; in true exceptionalistic style, our little military hero sees fit only to lament the loss of western lives.

But the real failing of this drivel & its author is that which marks the real tragedy of 911 & the 10 years that have passed since the event & that is the failure of any of our leaders to genuinely question the reasons behind the tragedy. That "rattus" even titles his piece as "a way of life attacked" displays his ignorance of history & world events. He would have done well to have read Robert Fisk on the subject of 911 & perhaps the world would not be in a worse position today than it was then?

Robert Fisk remembers the war mongers who longed for Muslim blood post 9/11

And the veteran Middle East journalist utters one of the key reasons the terrorist attacks happened; Israeli occupation of Palestine:

By their books, ye shall know them .....

I'm talking about the volumes, the libraries - nay, the very halls of literature - which the international crimes against humanity of 11 September 2001 have spawned. Many are spavined with pseudo-patriotism and self-regard, others rotten with the hopeless mythology of CIA/Mossad culprits, a few (from the Muslim world, alas) even referring to the killers as "boys", almost all avoiding the one thing which any cop looks for after a street crime: the motive.

Why so, I ask myself, after 10 years of war, hundreds of thousands of innocent deaths, lies and hypocrisy and betrayal and sadistic torture by the Americans - our MI5 chaps just heard, understood, maybe looked, of course no touchy-touchy nonsense - and the Taliban? Have we managed to silence ourselves as well as the world with our own fears? Are we still not able to say those three sentences: The 19 murderers of 9/11 claimed they were Muslims. They came from a place called the Middle East. Is there a problem out there?

American publishers first went to war in 2001 with massive photo-memorial volumes. Their titles spoke for themselves: Above Hallowed Ground, So Others Might Live, Strong of Heart, What We Saw, The Final Frontier, A Fury for God, The Shadow of Swords... Seeing this stuff piled on newsstands across America, who could doubt that the US was going to go to war? And long before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, another pile of tomes arrived to justify the war after the war. Most prominent among them was ex-CIA spook Kenneth Pollack's The Threatening Storm - and didn't we all remember Churchill's The Gathering Storm? - which, needless to say, compared the forthcoming battle against Saddam with the crisis faced by Britain and France in 1938.

There were two themes to this work by Pollack - "one of the world's leading experts on Iraq," the blurb told readers, among whom was Fareed Zakaria ("one of the most important books on American foreign policy in years," he drivelled) - the first of which was a detailed account of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction; none of which, as we know, actually existed. The second theme was the opportunity to sever the "linkage" between "the Iraq issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict".

The Palestinians, deprived of the support of powerful Iraq, went the narrative, would be further weakened in their struggle against Israeli occupation. Pollack referred to the Palestinians' "vicious terrorist campaign" - but without any criticism of Israel. He wrote of "weekly terrorist attacks followed by Israeli responses (sic)", the standard Israeli version of events. America's bias towards Israel was no more than an Arab "belief". Well, at least the egregious Pollack had worked out, in however slovenly a fashion, that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had something to do with 9/11, even if Saddam had not.

...

Publication of the official 9/11 report - in 2004, but read the new edition of 2011 - is indeed worth study, if only for the realities it does present, although its opening sentences read more like those of a novel than of a government inquiry. "Tuesday ... dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern United States... For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a safe and pleasant journey. Among the travellers were Mohamed Atta..." Were these guys, I ask myself, interns at Time magazine?

But I'm drawn to Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan whose The Eleventh Day confronts what the West refused to face in the years that followed 9/11. "All the evidence ... indicates that Palestine was the factor that united the conspirators - at every level," they write. One of the organisers of the attack believed it would make Americans concentrate on "the atrocities that America is committing by supporting Israel". Palestine, the authors state, "was certainly the principal political grievance ... driving the young Arabs (who had lived) in Hamburg".

The motivation for the attacks was "ducked" even by the official 9/11 report, say the authors. The commissioners had disagreed on this "issue" - cliché code word for "problem" - and its two most senior officials, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, were later to explain: "This was sensitive ground ...Commissioners who argued that al-Qa'ida was motivated by a religious ideology - and not by opposition to American policies - rejected mentioning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict... In their view, listing US support for Israel as a root cause of al-Qa'ida's opposition to the United States indicated that the United States should reassess that policy." And there you have it.

yes John...

And Tony Abbott was part of this monstruous charade...

pure wickedness .....

As the 10th anniversary of 9/11 approaches, get ready for an orgy of self-justification (endless war is required because "they" still hate us).

This piece by Seamus Milne in the UK Guardian is fascinating because it reveals the mindset of so many elites to the terror attacks. It's a handy reminder that fear-mongers and war-mongers became scared little boy and girls, calling for the blood of Muslims. Ten years on, those policies remain a disaster, with countless Western-led occupations continuing globally.

We are governed by bigoted children.

Here's Milne (who was the paper's opinion editor on 9/11):

By the time the second plane hit the World Trade Centre, the battle to define the 9/11 attacks had already begun, on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US President Bush made the fateful call for a war on terror, as the media rallied to the flag. In Britain Tony Blair and his cheerleaders enthusiastically fell into line. Inevitably, they faced a bit more opposition to the absurd claim that the atrocities had come out of a clear blue sky, and the country must follow wherever the wounded hyperpower led.

But not a lot. Political and media reaction to anyone who linked what had happened in New York and Washington to US and western intervention in the Muslim world, or challenged the drive to war, was savage.

From September 11 2001 onwards, the Guardian (almost uniquely in the British press) nevertheless ensured that those voices would be unmistakably heard in a full-spectrum debate about why the attacks had taken place and how the US and wider western world should respond.

The backlash verged on the deranged. Bizarre as it seems a decade on, the fact that the Guardian allowed writers to connect the attacks with US policy in the rest of the world was treated as treasonous in its supposed "anti-Americanism".

Michael Gove, now a Conservative cabinet minister, wrote in the Times that the Guardian had become a "Prada-Meinhof gang" of "fifth columnists". The novelist Robert Harris, then still a Blair intimate, denounced us for hosting a "babble of idiots" unable to grasp that the world was now in a reprise of the war against Hitler.

The Telegraph ran a regular "useful idiots" column targeted at the Guardian, while Andrew Neil declared the newspaper should be renamed the "Daily Terrorist" and the Sun's Richard Littlejohn lambasted us as the "anti-American propagandists of the fascist left press".

Not that the Guardian published only articles joining the dots to US imperial policy or opposing the US-British onslaught on Afghanistan. Far from it: in first few days we ran pieces from James Rubin, a Clinton administration assistant secretary; the ex-Nato commander Wesley Clark; William Shawcross ("We are all Americans now"); and the Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland, calling for vengeance - among others backing military retaliation.

The problem for the Guardian's critics was that we also gave space to those who were against it and realised the war on terror would fail, bringing horror and bloodshed to millions in the process. Its comment pages hosted the full range of views the bulk of the media blanked; in other words, the paper gave rein to the pluralism that most media gatekeepers claim to favour in principle, but struggle to put into practice. And we commissioned Arabs and Muslims, Afghans and Iraqis, routinely shut out of the western media.

So on the day after 9/11, the Guardian published the then Labour MP George Galloway on "reaping the whirlwind" of the US's global role. Then the Arab writer Rana Kabbani warned that only a change of policy towards the rest of the world would bring Americans security (for which she was grotesquely denounced as a "terror tart" by the US journalist Greg Palast). The following day Jonathan Steele predicted (against the received wisdom of the time) that the US and its allies would fail to subdue Afghanistan.

Who would argue with that today, as the US death toll in Afghanistan reached a new peak in August? Or with those who warned of the dangers of ripping up civil rights, now we know about Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib and "extraordinary rendition"? Or that the war on terror would fuel and spread terrorism, including in Pakistan, or that an invasion of Iraq would be a blood-drenched disaster - as a string of Guardian writers did in the tense weeks after 9/11?

As the Guardian's comment editor at the time, my column in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was a particular target of hostility, especially among those who insisted the attacks had nothing to do with US intervention, or its support for occupation and dictatorship, in the Arab and Muslim world. Others felt it was too early to speak about such things when Americans had suffered horrific losses.

But it was precisely in those first days, when the US administration was setting a course for catastrophe, that it was most urgent to rebut Bush and Blair's mendacious spin that this was an attack on "freedom" and our "way of life" - and nothing to do with what the US (and Britain) had imposed on the Middle East and elsewhere. And most of the 5,000 emails I received in response, including from US readers, agreed with that argument.

Three months later Kabul had fallen, and Downing Street issued a triumphant condemnation of those in the media who had opposed the invasion of Afghanistan (including myself and other Guardian writers) and had supposedly "proved to be wrong" about the war on terror. Rupert Murdoch's Sun duly denounced us as "war weasels".

Among these "weasels" was the Guardian's Madeleine Bunting, who had raised the prospect that Afghanistan could become another Vietnam and the focus of "protracted guerrilla warfare" - when the former Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown (like the government) was insisting that the idea of a "long drawn-out guerrilla campaign" in Afghanistan was "fanciful". A decade on, we know who "proved to be wrong".

The most heartening response to the breadth of Guardian commentary after 9/11 came from the US itself, where debate about what had happened, and why, was as good as shut down in the mainstream media in the wake of the attacks. One byproduct of that official public silence was a dramatic increase in US readership of the Guardian's website, as millions of Americans looked for a perspective and range of views they weren't getting at home.

Traffic on the Guardian's website doubled in the months after 9/11, driven from the US. Articles from the Guardian were taped in bookshop windows from Brooklyn to San Francisco. As Emily Bell, then editor of Guardian Unlimited and now digital director at Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism, puts it, the post-9/11 debate was "totally transformative" for the Guardian, turning it into one of the two fastest growing news sites in the US - and creating the springboard for a US readership now larger by some measures than in Britain.

Which only goes to show how those who accused us of "anti-Americanism" in 2001 so utterly misjudged the society they claimed to champion.

Antony Loewenstein

The first 9/11...

from Noam Chomsky

The first 9/11, unlike the second, did not change the world. It was “nothing of very great consequence”, as Henry Kissinger assured his boss a few days later.

These events of little consequence were not limited to the military coup that destroyed Chilean democracy and set in motion the horror story that followed. The first 9/11 was just one act in a drama which began in 1962, when John F Kennedy shifted the mission of the Latin American military from “hemispheric defense” - an anachronistic holdover from World War II - to “internal security”, a concept with a chilling interpretation in US-dominated Latin American circles.

In the recently published Cambridge University History of the Cold War, Latin American scholar John Coatsworth writes that from that time to “the Soviet collapse in 1990, the numbers of political prisoners, torture victims, and executions of non-violent political dissenters in Latin America vastly exceeded those in the Soviet Union and its East European satellites”, including many religious martyrs and mass slaughter as well, always supported or initiated in Washington. The last major violent act was the brutal murder of six leading Latin American intellectuals, Jesuit priests, a few days after the Berlin Wall fell. The perpetrators were an elite Salvadorean battalion, which had already left a shocking trail of blood, fresh from renewed training at the JFK School of Special Warfare, acting on direct orders of the high command of the US client state.

The consequences of this hemispheric plague still, of course, reverberate.

From kidnapping and torture to assassination

All of this, and much more like it, is dismissed as of little consequence, and forgotten. Those whose mission is to rule the world enjoy a more comforting picture, articulated well enough in the current issue of the prestigious (and valuable) journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. The lead article discusses “the visionary international order” of the “second half of the twentieth century” marked by “the universalisation of an American vision of commercial prosperity”. There is something to that account, but it does not quite convey the perception of those at the wrong end of the guns.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/09/20119775453842191.html

smoking guns .....

Over 120 CIA documents concerning 9/11, Osama bin Laden and counterterrorism were published today for the first time, having been newly declassified and released to the National Security Archive. The documents were released after the NSA pored through the footnotes of the 9/11 Commission and sent Freedom of Information Act requests.

The material contains much new information about the hunt before and after 9/11 for bin Laden, the development of the drone campaign in AfPak, and al-Qaida’s relationship with America’s ally, Pakistan. Perhaps most damning are the documents showing that the CIA had bin Laden in its cross hairs a full year before 9/11 — but didn’t get the funding from the Bush administration White House to take him out or even continue monitoring him. The CIA materials directly contradict the many claims of Bush officials that it was aggressively pursuing al-Qaida prior to 9/11, and that nobody could have predicted the attacks. “I don’t think the Bush administration would want to see these released, because they paint a picture of the CIA knowing something would happen before 9/11, but they didn’t get the institutional support they needed,” says Barbara Elias-Sanborn, the NSA fellow who edited the materials.

Let’s start there. In 2000 and 2001, the CIA began using Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Afghanistan. “The idea of using UAVs originated in April 2000 as a result of a request from the NSC’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the CIA and the Department of Defense to come up with new ideas to go after the terrorists in Afghanistan,” a 2004 document summarizes. The Pentagon approved the plan for surveillance purposes.

And yet, simultaneously, the CIA declared that budget concerns were forcing it to move its Counterterrorism Center/Osama bin Laden Unit from an “offensive” to a “defensive” posture. For the CIA, that meant trying to get Afghan tribal leaders and the Northern Alliance to kill or capture bin Laden, Elias-Sanborn says. “It was forced to be less of a kinetic operation,” she says. “It had to be only for surveillance, which was not what they considered an offensive posture.”

“Budget concerns … CT [counterterrorism] supplemental still at NSC-OMB [National Security Council – Office of Management and Budget] level,” an April 2000 document reads. “Need forward movement on supplemental soonest due to expected early recess due to conventions, campaigning and elections.” In addition, the Air Force told the CIA that if it lost a drone, the CIA would have to pay for it, which made the agency more reluctant to use the technology.

Still, the drone program began in September 2000. One drone swiftly twice observed an individual “most likely to have been Bin Laden.” But since the CIA only had permission to use the drones for intelligence gathering, it had no way to act on its findings. The agency submitted a proposal to the National Security Council staff in December 2000 that would have significantly expanded the program. “It was too late for the departing Clinton Administration to take action on this strategic request,” however. It wasn’t too late for the Bush administration, though. It just never did.

Former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has taken credit for the drone program that the Bush administration ignored. “Things like working to get an armed Predator that actually turned out to be extraordinarily important, working to get a strategy that would allow us to get better cooperation from Pakistan and from the Central Asians,” she said in 2006. “We were not left a comprehensive strategy to fight al-Qaida.” Rice claimed that the Bush administration continued the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism policies, a claim the documents disprove. “If the administration wanted to get it done, I’m sure they could have gotten it done,” says Elias-Sanborn.

Many of the documents publicize for the first time what was first made clear in the 9/11 Commission: The White House received a truly remarkable amount of warnings that al-Qaida was trying to attack the United States. From June to September 2001, a full seven CIA Senior Intelligence Briefs detailed that attacks were imminent, an incredible amount of information from one intelligence agency. One from June called “Bin-Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats” writes that “[redacted] expects Usama Bin Laden to launch multiple attacks over the coming days.” The famous August brief called “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike the US” is included. “Al-Qai’da members, including some US citizens, have resided in or travelled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure here,” it says.

During the entire month of August, President Bush was on vacation at his ranch in Texas — which tied with one of Richard Nixon’s as the longest vacation ever taken by a president. CIA Director George Tenet has said he didn’t speak to Bush once that month, describing the president as being “on leave.” Bush did not hold a Principals’ meeting on terrorism until September 4, 2001, having downgraded the meetings to a deputies’ meeting, which then-counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke has repeatedly said slowed down anti-Bin Laden efforts “enormously, by months.”

For all the information the documents reveal, one huge matter is conspicuously absent: torture. There are nearly 50 CIA documents relating to such matters as the interrogation of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the intelligence gleaned from him, and yet “none of them were declassified at all,” notes Elias-Sanborn. “Certainly, the CIA has a stake in revealing what they did,” and they clearly do not want to reveal their complicity in war crimes.

One last thing is worth mentioning from the documents published today:  Anyone with any doubt that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is dangerous to the United States is contradicting U.S. intelligence. “Violence between Israelis and the Palestinians, moreover is making Sunni extremists more willing to participate in attacks against US or Israeli interests,” the CIA wrote in February 2001. It is not the only piece of information revealed by the new documents that will be deeply uncomfortable for the Bush administration and hawks across the country.

Jordan Michael Smith writes about U.S. foreign policy for Salon. He has written for the New York Times, Boston Globe and Washington Post.

New NSA Docs Contradict 9/11 Claims