Wednesday 1st of December 2021

the idiots we have had to endure...


In his new book, Yale historian Samuel Moyn explores whether the push to make U.S. wars more “humane” by banning torture and limiting civilian casualties has helped fuel more military interventions around the world. He looks in detail at the role of President Obama in expanding the use of drones even as he received the Nobel Peace Prize.


“What happened after 2001 is that, in the midst of an extremely brutal war on terror, a new kind of war emerged. … It was important to Americans to see their wars fought more humanely,” says Moyn. “Even though this represents a kind of progress, it also helped Americans sustain war and helped make the war on terror endless.” Moyn’s new book is “Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War.





This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.  

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!,, The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh, as we spend the rest of the hour with author and Yale University history professor Samuel Moyn. He’s just published a remarkable book, Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War. It looks at how the U.S. created a world of endless wars and helped reinvent the rules of war. The book came out earlier this week, just after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan after nearly two decades of occupation and days ahead of the 20th anniversary of the September 11th attacks and the launch of the so-called war on terror.

Professor Samuel Moyn, welcome to Democracy Now! It’s great to have you with us. Start off by talking about this very revealing title, Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War.

SAMUEL MOYN: Well, Amy, the United States has been at war since before it even existed, against Native peoples, and later beyond its borders. And especially since World War II, America has been at war globally. But all those wars were brutal in the extreme, and there were no rules prohibiting brutal conduct, by design.

What happened after 2001 is that, in the midst of an extremely brutal war on terror, a new kind of war emerged, and it was one in which, really for the first time, it was important to Americans to see their wars fought more humanely, in conformity with international rules that prohibit torture, that limit civilian death. And the worry is that even though this represents a kind of progress, it also helped Americans sustain war and help make the war on terror endless. Even though Joe Biden has withdrawn troops, he has promised to continue the war on terror in other ways.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Sam Moyn, you also make the argument that a more humane war — this idea of a more humane war has accompanied an increasingly interventionist foreign policy. So, if you could elaborate on that and also the fact, that you detail in the book, of the role of human rights organizations in advancing this view — Human Rights Watch, for example, which you say initially didn’t take any position on war but then came to support certain humanitarian interventions?

SAMUEL MOYN: So, I would start the story with Vietnam, which was a much more brutal war, illegal in the international system, but also in blatant violation, with lots more torture than the war on terror and a lot more civilian death. And there was an antiwar movement in response to it. And the revelations of the My Lai massacre, which were so horrifying, added fuel to the fire of that antiwar movement. But then George McGovern, the peace candidate, really the last peace candidate we’ve had in this country, lost badly, and Democrats came to learn the lesson — I think, the wrong lesson — that they needed to be as interventionist as the Republicans, whom they were fighting for power. And so, we see, across the later years of the Cold War and into the 1990s, high-minded rationales for American intervention, even though many of these interventions, like the Kosovo bombings, violated the international rules that prohibit the use of force. And the question I’m posing is whether we’ve forgotten about those rules, even as we’ve come to focus on the rules that say, once you go to war, you can’t fight brutally.

Human Rights Watch is an excellent example of these, let’s say, imbalanced priorities. So, when it began monitoring wars in the 1980s and '90s, it promised never to take a stand on whether the wars themselves are unjust or indeed illegal, but they did say they would monitor whether wars are conducted illegally, whether there's torture, whether there’s excess collateral damage. Now, it’s also true, as you mentioned, Nermeen, that Human Rights Watch has sometimes strayed from that commitment and endorsed some great power wars.

But my question is whether — alongside groups like Human Rights Watch, that we need monitoring the conduct of wars, how they’re fought — whether we need to get back some of the antiwar sentiment that was present in American history, at least intermittently, before. After all, the laws of war are incredibly permissive. What they allow states to do once war begins is extraordinarily violent, even when it’s supposedly humane. And also remember that soldiers die, not just civilians, on both sides. And so, our ancestors sometimes said, “We really need to keep war from happening.” And it’s that lesson that we’ve stopped learning in the age of the war on terror, when we’ve let the humanity of our wars compensate for the fact that they just keep on going.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: Well, Sam, one of the other arguments you make is that — and also this is a continuation of the effect of the Vietnam War — that once the draft was ended in the U.S., the military here embraced humanitarian laws of war in an unprecedented fashion — you write, quote, “a self-humanization of armed force without precedent in the history of any great power.” Could you elaborate on that and explain why that was the case?

SAMUEL MOYN: So, this period of the later ’60s and the 1970s was pivotal for the morality of how war is fought around the world. Partly, there were all kinds of new states after decolonization, and they were made up of peoples who had been the victims of brutal American and European wars for centuries, and they demanded more humanity. Europeans had stopped their empires and relied on the United States to protect them, and so they were in position to ask for more humane wars now that they were no longer fighting them.

Americans, including in the military, understood that military force had to be inflicted in a more ethical, or at least more optically humane, way, because My Lai was such a public relations disaster for the military. People were shocked. Before, it was permissible to inflict the most kind of brutal violence on enemies, especially if they were nonwhite enemies, around the world, and Americans celebrated when that violence was perpetrated. After My Lai, the military realized it needed to accept some constraints on the way it fights, in the name of being able to claim that it was a moral force.

And so, it was utterly important that even as humanitarians in Human Rights Watch and other groups stopped caring about whether there was American war and focusing on how it was fought, so, too, the military, which wants to keep its missions going, was willing to accept some constraints on how those missions are conducted.

AMY GOODMAN: I wanted to turn, Professor Moyn, to President Obama’s Nobel Prize speech. It was December 10, 2009, when President Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway. This is a clip from his acceptance speech.

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: We must begin by acknowledging a hard truth: We will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations, acting individually or in concert, will find the use of force not only necessary, but morally justified. … Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard-bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom we fight. That is a source of our strength.

AMY GOODMAN: “That is what makes us different from those we fight. That is a source of our strength.” You repeatedly reference, Professor Moyn, this Nobel acceptance speech in your book. Can you talk about the significance of this and the intensification of the drone wars?

SAMUEL MOYN: So, what fascinates me about Barack Obama is that he was a public moralist, and he thought publicly about the moral significance of law, in particular. And he talked about it in that extraordinary address, as well as the one four years later defending the use of drones. Now, Obama famously wanted to see himself as an heir of Martin Luther King Jr. And in certain ways, he was. He claimed, or repeated, the belief that the arc of the moral universe bends towards justice. But where King had disputed the use of force when it’s immoral — going to war, in the case of Vietnam — not just how American force was used, Obama ignored the first issue, or justified eternal war, as you heard, and focused on the second, as if how Americans fight would guarantee the moral propriety of the endless wars they’re still fighting today.

When it came to 2013, he gave an equally remarkable speech at the National Defense University, where he said —

AMY GOODMAN: Let me go to that clip, because we happen to have it.

SAMUEL MOYN: All right. Excellent.

AMY GOODMAN: Yes, in May of 2013, at National Defense University, the one that the well-known peace activist Medea Benjamin of CodePink interrupted. This is President Obama.

MEDEA BENJAMIN: How about Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, 16-year-old American citizen —


MEDEA BENJAMIN: — killed [inaudible]?


MEDEA BENJAMIN: Is that the way we treat a 16-year-old American?


MEDEA BENJAMIN: Why was he killed?


MEDEA BENJAMIN: Can you tell us why Abdulrahman al-Awlaki was killed? Can you tell the Muslim people their lives are as precious as our lives? Can you take the drones out of the hands of the CIA? Can you to stop the signature strikes that are killing people on the basis of suspicious activities?

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: We’re addressing that, ma’am.

MEDEA BENJAMIN: Will you apologize to the thousands of Muslims that you have killed? Will you compensate the innocent family victims? That will make us safer here at home. I love my country. I love the rule of law. Drones are making us less safe. And keeping people in indefinite detention in Guantánamo is making us less safe. Abide by the rule of law. You’re a constitutional lawyer.

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: You know, I think that the — and I’m going off script, as you might expect, here. The — the voice of that woman is worth paying attention to. Obviously — obviously, I do not agree with much of what she said. And obviously she wasn’t listening to me in much of what I said. But these are tough issues, and the suggestion that we can gloss over them is wrong.

AMY GOODMAN: And that audience member, I daresay, he knew exactly who she was, CodePink’s Medea Benjamin, if you had trouble hearing, saying, “Thousands of Muslims that got killed. Will you compensate the innocent families? That will make us safer here at home.” She said, “I love my country. Drone strikes are making us less safe. Keeping people in indefinite detention is making us less safe.” Samuel Moyn?

SAMUEL MOYN: Again, it’s such a morally dramatic moment, not least because you might wonder, after hearing that exchange, which one of them really deserved the Nobel Peace Prize. But what I write about in my book, because I think that moment was, in a way, the climax of Obama’s presidency, at least judged as a moment when he was morally reflecting on his deeds, he conceded that there needs to be some control on war. And if you listen to her, mainly what she’s asking is for less inhumanity.

What’s amazing is that Obama himself goes on in the speech to say maybe the problem is not so much the brutality of the drones, but that we’re fighting endless war at all, because, he says, these kinds of wars will have effects not just on our victims, but on the perpetrators, too. And he anticipated, I think, in that address, if you read it, the coming of Donald Trump as a kind of — you know, a kind of consequence of what happens when nations fight endless war. And sadly, we’re still doing it.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: We just have a second, Sam, but could you elaborate on that? Why is Trump an effect of that endless war?

SAMUEL MOYN: Well, so, as Spencer Ackerman and so many others have written and talked about on your show, wars fought are never without consequences for the states that fight them, even though, of course, we should be concerned, first and foremost, about those who die or those who are merely surveilled and haunted by drones and special forces.

This really matters because it’s essential that when Biden gave his two speeches the other week defending the pullout from Afghanistan, he made utterly clear that while giving up on failed counterinsurgency, he is turning to, and maybe will intensify himself, the real fruit of 9/11, which is kind of endless counterterror, no matter what the constraints of international law say, unless they require the drones to strike or the special forces to visit with care for the victims.

AMY GOODMAN: Samuel Moyn, we want to thank you for being with us. His new book, Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War, professor of law and history at Yale University


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FREE JULIAN ASSANGE NOW !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

the dubya foul spirit...

Maybe the real jihadis were inside us all along. At least, that’s what George W. Bush would have you think.

This past Saturday, in what was meant to be a memorial service for those who died retaking Flight 93 from Al Qaeda hijackers 20 years before, the former president used his speech to attack political opponents. Drawing a direct parallel between those who turned passenger planes into weapons of mass destruction and those with whom he does not see eye to eye on domestic questions, Bush presented an apocalyptic warning:


…We have seen growing evidence that the dangers to our country can come not only across borders, but from violence that gathers within. There is little cultural overlap between violent extremists abroad and violent extremists at home. But in their disdain for pluralism, in their disregard for human life, in their determination to defile national symbols, they are children of the same foul spirit. And it is our continuing duty to confront them.


Though Bush (never one to speak clearly) does not go so far as to name those he maligns, it is fairly obvious that this is not a shot at the race rioters who torched America’s cities all last summer. The “violent extremists at home” Bush has in mind are clearly just those on the right, with a particular focus on the few thousand who marched to the Capitol in January to express their concern over a questionable election — the spiritual brethren of Osama bin Laden, somehow.

All three alleged points of comparison are bizarre.


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the peaceman...

FREE JULIAN ASSANGE NOW !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!



bombing mistake...

After weeks of insisting the August 29 drone strike in Kabul killed an ISIS-K terrorist, US Central Command has admitted that the victims were all civilians, including children, but reportedly won’t discipline anyone involved.

Marine General Kenneth McKenzie, head of CENTCOM, on Friday announced that the Hellfire missile fired at a home in Kabul just before the US airlift ended did not in fact kill a facilitator of Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K) terrorist group.

The drone strike in Kabul “was a mistake,” McKenzie said, acknowledging that “ten civilians, including up to seven children were tragically killed.” 

The strike was ordered in “earnest belief that it would prevent an imminent threat to our forces,” but “it was a mistake and I offer my sincere apology,” he added, offering “profound condolences” to the relatives of those killed.

GEN Frank McKenzie admits ⁦@CENTCOM⁩ made a mistake, that innocent Afghans were killed, takes responsibility & then walks through what they think went wrong. Wish there was more of that in Washington. Conflict is chaotic and often tragic as in this case.

— Mark R. Jacobson (@markondefense) September 17, 2021


"No disciplinary action expected, officials say. US military stands by intel leading to strike."Dictionary definition of "impunity" for what is clearly a WAR CRIME.

— Nebojša Malić (@NebojsaMalic) September 17, 2021


McKenzie walked the reporters through the US decision to launch the strike, citing “over 60 pieces of intelligence” about an imminent attack by Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), the terrorist group that claimed responsibility for the August 26 suicide bombing at Kabul airport, killing 13 US troops and 170 Afghan civilians. Half a dozen US drones monitored Kabul, and multiple intelligence reports spoke of a white Toyota Corolla being used as a car bomb.


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IMAGINE THE CRAP SHOULD THE USA MAKE A "MISTAKE' AGAINST CHINA ! The little Aussie lap dog Morrison would have got us into deep shit... 



death toll of revenge...

Twenty years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, compelling statistical data has emerged suggesting that the true death toll of the ‘War on Terror’ could be as high as six million people – and that this colossal figure is itself likely to be conservative.


Nafeez Ahmed examines the direct and indirect deaths of the post 9/11 era, as a new kind of state-sanctioned mass violence became globalised and normalised




The Costs of War Project

Earlier this month, Brown University’s Costs of War project updated its rolling analysis of the number of people killed in direct violence due to the post-9/11 ‘War on Terror’.

It found that just under a million people – between 897,000 and 929,000 – were killed directly due to violence across five theatres of war involving significant US and Western military involvement: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. 

These numbers have been widely reported as proving that around one million people have been killed in post-9/11 wars. Yet, they are extremely conservative figures.

The real death toll is far, far higher – a fact that has not been properly reported in media reports.

“The deaths we tallied are likely a vast under-count of the true toll these wars have taken on human life,” said the co-author of the Costs of War project report Professor Neta Crawford – noting that the tally does not incorporate indirect deaths due to the consequences of war through the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

The new figures therefore do not account for the many indirect deaths the War on Terror has caused by way of disease, displacement and loss of access to food or clean drinking water, she acknowledged.

The Geneva Declaration report concludes that we are safe to assume on average four indirect deaths to every direct death in contemporary conflicts

An Invisible Death Toll

The most accurate way to calculate the scale of total deaths would be through epidemiological surveys to determine ‘excess deaths’ by comparing pre-war and post-war mortality rates, which would encompass both direct and indirect deaths.

However, in many of these countries, the infrastructure to monitor and collect the relevant data does not exist or is very hard to obtain, which is why such surveys are rare. 

In the absence of epidemiological analysis, it is still possible to develop a clear sense of the minimum likely scale of indirect deaths.

Last September, when commenting on an earlier version of the project’s findings, Costs of War report co-author Professor Catherine Lutz pointed out that “one has to multiply that direct death number… by an estimated two to four times to get to the total number of people – in the millions – who are dead today who would not have been dead had the wars not been fought”. But even this approach is likely to produce an under-count.

According to a landmark report by the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development – signed by 113 governments – in “the majority of conflicts since the early 1990s, for which good data is available, the burden of indirect deaths was between three and 15 times the number of direct deaths”. 

The report found that, due to the impact of conflicts on public services and infrastructure, vastly greater numbers of people end up dying indirectly from the consequences of violence compared to the number that die directly from conflict.

The range varies based on different factors such as the levels of economic development in a country before a war, the duration of fighting, the intensity of combat, the population’s access to basic care and services, and the success of humanitarian relief efforts. 

The more intense the fighting and the more degraded the level of infrastructure, the higher the number of indirect deaths. 

The report concluded that “a reasonable average estimate would be a ratio of four indirect deaths to one direct death in contemporary conflicts”.

However, it should be noted that this ratio is a minimum average that is likely to be extremely conservative in relation to the impact of Western-backed military interventions. For instance, six months after the bombing campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, data assessed by the Guardian revealedthat, although between 1,300 and 1,800 Afghans were killed directly, as many as 20,000 and possibly as high as 49,600 people had died due to the indirect consequences of the military intervention. In this case, the total number of indirect deaths was at least 15 times higher than direct deaths.

If that higher, empirically-substantiated ratio was applied to the Costs of War direct death figures in Afghanistan since 9/11 (176,000 people), it would imply 2,640,000 indirect deaths in that country to date, which would suggest that in just one country a total of about 2.8 million Afghans have been killed due to the War on Terror.

This scale of violence has been corroborated by one other assessment of avoidable mortality in Afghanistan by retired La Trobe University biochemist Dr Gideon Polya. His book, Body Count: Global Avoidable Mortality Since 1950, put total excess deaths of Afghans since 2001 at three million.

The very dynamics of mass violence have become globalised and normalised, precisely because our political and cultural institutions are incapable of acknowledging that such state-sanctioned terrorism even exists

While the Geneva Declaration approach cannot be used to produce precise figures, it can provide an accurate insight into the likely order of magnitude of total deaths in a way that simple direct death figures cannot.

Applying its methodology to the Costs of War project figures suggests that the overall number of indirect deaths from 20 years of the War on Terror is between at least 3,588,000 and 3,716,000 people. This indicates that Brown University’s one million figure is extremely conservative and that the total death toll is actually at least between 4,485,000 and 4,645,000 people. 

Once again, these cannot be taken as specific figures, but rather as an indication of the real magnitude of deaths – likely to be a minimum of 4.5 million people. Even this estimate is highly likely to be too low, given that the real ratio could be larger than 4:1, and in Afghanistan, for instance, was 15:1 at the height of the 2001 bombing campaign.

Syria and Libya

In 2019, I was commissioned by the Hub Foundation in California to examine the available data on deaths in Muslim-majority regions as a consequence of post-9/11 conflicts. The data from that exercise suggest that some of Brown University’s figures for direct deaths are almost certainly too low. 

In particular, the project’s estimate of the Syrian death toll is only 266,000, based on death tallies for after US intervention in 2014. The authors acknowledge that many of these deaths would also have been caused by other parties. 

But as I have documented for the International State Crime Initiative at Queen Mary University of London, US and Western intervention in Syria began much earlier – as early as 2011 – and took a range of covert and overt forms which played a crucial role in igniting and prolonging the conflict in various ways.

While this does not lessen the responsibility of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and his backers – Russia and Iran – in the violence, it does show that it is arbitrary to begin the death count in 2014 as if that is the pivotal date of US involvement. This means that the actual direct death toll in Syria is far higher – around some 511,000 people (according to groups both opposed to and sympathetic to Assad) – a figure which itself is probably conservative. 

In addition to the five theatres of war examined by Brown University, I had also incorporated data from the NATO intervention in Libya, including some 27,361 direct deaths. When the Geneva Declaration 4:1 average ratio is applied to these figures, the numbers are sobering. My original analysis in 2019 had incorporated Brown University’s older data compiled that year, but the new report shows the figures are now higher. 

Below, I have incorporated Brown University’s new figures to update my original analysis, along with the more accurate figures for Syria, and taking into account Libya, to develop a range of plausible estimates of indirect deaths that should be recognised as probably conservative. 

More than 5.8 million Total Deaths

Rather than applying the Geneva Declaration approach wholesale to the overall direct death figures, I have applied it case-by-case for each theatre of war to produce a likely order of magnitude figure for indirect deaths.

These final figures are then totalled to generate an overall cumulative death toll for each conflict zone, which in turn is used to calculate an overall estimate for the total number of deaths across all these theatres of war. As these are not precise figures, they have been rounded to the nearest thousand.



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Note: not all people who got killed were terrorists... Most were "co-lateral" damage... including kids and old people...